INTRODUCTION
All eyes are once again on NML v. Argentina (NML) as sovereign debt's "trial of the century" has entered the endgame phase.
1 Talks between Argentina and holdout creditors were even a prominent storyline at the 46th World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
2 After a hostile standoff with U.S. courts under the Kirchner administration, the recently elected Macri government pledged to negotiate a settlement and quickly put forth an offer. 3 The outcome of Argentina's debt dispute has critical implications for sovereign debt markets, which are a systemically important component of the global economy. 4 Recent events-including crises in Greece, Puerto Rico, and Ukraine-underscore the implications of sovereign debt markets for policymakers, financial systems, and ordinary citizens alike. 5 Argentina's debt saga began with an $81.3 billion default in 2001, the largest-ever sovereign default at that time. 6 A number of "holdout" creditorswith bonds worth $6 billion at face value-sat out of Argentina's 2005 and 2010 debt restructurings, with many opting instead for litigation. 7 After years in the Second Circuit, NML finally hit a boiling point in 2014. 8 Following a string of losses in federal courts and a failed petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Argentina again slipped into default as payments to exchange creditors were blocked by a court injunction. 9 Argentina's debt imbroglio offers valuable 8 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 examples and lessons at various stages in sovereign finance-issuance, default, restructuring, litigation, and post-litigation. This Article focuses on the postlitigation stage.
NML ignited widespread commentary in academic, policy, and industry circles. Building on a substantial body of existing literature involving sovereign debt restructuring and litigation, 10 scholars explored the significant implications of Argentina's default and the NML fallout. 11 Reactions followed from institutions such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the International Monetary Fund, among others.
12 NML has also prompted feedback from industry organizations representing various constituencies in international financial markets. Between scarce currency reserves and political sensitivities surrounding the holdout situation, Argentina's government faces a delicate balancing act.
14 Finding a reasonable value for settling the claims that the holdouts will accept and Argentina can afford-financially and politically-will not be easy. 15 Serious challenges remain, including structural questions about Argentina's settlement offer and issues of inter-creditor equity among the holdouts. 16 Initial reactions to Argentina's preliminary offer illustrate the complexity and gravity of inter-creditor issues for a potential settlement. 17 The role of injunctions in the NML litigation is still critical-even at the settlement stage. 18 In this Article, we address economic and legal factors underlying Argentina's holdout litigation with an emphasis on key issues for settlement negotiations. We contribute original financial data and legal analysis to the NML debate, which has critical implications for the broader world of sovereign finance. Specifically, our quantitative analysis illustrates holdout rates by bond, outstanding defaulted bonds by currency and applicable law, the current value of holdout claims compared to Argentina's 2005 exchange offer, and returns for hypothetical holdout creditors under various investment scenarios. We close by evaluating legal and policy factors related to a potential NML settlement. interest factors at play in a potential NML settlement, including the role of ratable payment injunctions in the settlement phase of the NML litigation. We then offer concluding observations.
I. ARGENTINA'S HOLDOUT LITIGATION
This Part breaks down Argentina's debt saga in detail across three key stages: default, restructuring, and litigation. This Part will first explain the dimensions of Argentina's remarkable default and restructuring process, which set the stage for the extraordinary amount of holdout litigation facing Argentina. This Part then traces the evolution of the NML litigation in U.S. courts and provides a detailed bond-by-bond look at holdout claims.
A. Default and Restructuring
Following a devastating economic crisis, Argentina's 2001 default was epic in both proportion and complexity. 19 In a short but traumatic period, Argentina's economy contracted dramatically as unemployment topped twenty percent and half of the population fell under the poverty line. 20 At that time, Argentina's $135 billion default was the largest sovereign debt default to date. 21 The complexity of the default was also staggering with 150 different bonds, denominated in six currencies under the laws of eight different jurisdictions, and a highly fractured creditor base of over half a million bondholders.
22
But a record default was only the beginning. These factors paved the way for an extraordinarily difficult restructuring process. Sovereign debt markets exist in a legal and regulatory void. 23 Without a formal bankruptcy system, sovereign insolvency is resolved through voluntary restructuring. 24 defaulted bonds are swapped for new debt, or "exchange" bonds. 25 Creditor losses-the "haircut"-have a bearing on restructuring outcomes, such as creditor participation and holdout litigation. 26 In Argentina's case, a harsh haircut led to a protracted and remarkably combative restructuring process.
27
At seventy-three percent, Argentina's haircut was considerably higher than the average of thirty-seven percent for all sovereign restructurings from 1978 to 2010.
28
With two bond exchanges-one in 2005 and another in 2010-Argentina's restructuring process was also extraordinarily long. 29 Creditor participation was also unusually low. The 2005 exchange saw only seventy-six percent participation, but the second exchange in 2010 brought overall participation to about ninety-three percent with bonds worth about $6.03 billion holding out.
30
Even then, participation in Argentina's restructuring remained relatively low. By comparison, between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate in a sample of thirty-four sovereign debt restructurings was ninety-five percent.
31
High holdout rates spawned an extraordinary amount of litigation against Argentina, led by distressed debt hedge funds. 32 Eventually, after a string of major legal setbacks, Argentina's holdout litigation led to a contested default 25 Debt rescheduling and debt reduction are common methods for restructuring distressed or defaulted in 2014-declared by major credit agencies but denied by the Argentine government-as payments sent by Argentina to exchange creditors were blocked by court injunctions.
33

B. The Evolution of NML Litigation, 2002-2014
Litigated for over a decade through different phases of Argentina's debt crisis, the NML litigation has been exceptional across the board-in duration, volume, implications, and controversy. 34 Creditor claims were filed as early as 2002-long before NML finally reached a boiling point as injunctions led to Argentina's 2014 default. 35 In the early stages of NML, courts were sympathetic to Argentina's legitimate interest in restructuring, even supporting efforts to that end. 36 In doing so, the Second Circuit prevented holdout claims from derailing restructuring efforts, citing the importance of debt restructuring for Argentina's economy. 38 Focus turned to Argentine assets as plaintiffs began invoking alter ego arguments, but sovereign immunity thwarted these attempts. 39 After years of litigation, holdout plaintiffs remained empty handed. But after years of defiance by Argentina, the court's patience waned. 40 Argentina's defiance was clear at both the trial court 41 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 42 Ultimately, frustration with Argentina's noncompliance led the court to take drastic measures through injunctive relief. 43 Even for a plaintiff with a money judgment in hand, collecting against an unwilling sovereign is no easy task. 44 As efforts to seize Argentina's assets failed, holdout plaintiffs began invoking pari passu in claims against Argentina. 45 Often found in cross-border debt instruments, the meaning of the enigmatic pari passu or "equal step" clause is uncertain and highly contested in the sovereign debt context. 46 Generally, the clause obligates the debtor to maintain the securities on equal footing or equal priority with other specified securities. Argentina's pari passu clause reads:
The securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.
47
The district court found that Argentina had violated its pari passu clause in (a) continuing payments to exchange bondholders without paying the holdouts and (b) enacting legislation that prohibited payments to holdouts. 48 Most importantly, the court's interpretation of Argentina's pari passu laid the foundation for broadly applicable ratable payment injunctions. 49 According to the NML ratable payment injunctions, before continuing to pay exchange creditors amounts due (coupon payments on the exchange bonds), Argentina had to make ratable payments to holdout plaintiffs (the full value of their claims). 50 So the injunction forced Argentina to decide between paying the holdouts in full and defaulting on payment obligations to exchange creditors.
51
Even further, the injunctions were broadly applicable to third partiesincluding financial intermediaries-not just Argentina. 52 The scope of the injunctions included "all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon, preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment of the Exchange Bonds." 53 Anticipating continued defiance by Argentina, the court aimed enforcement at innocent third parties who were more likely to comply with judicial orders. 54 Though startling and controversial, this interpretation of pari passu was not completely unprecedented. 55 Despite urging from the U.S. The first takeaway from Exhibit 1 is that holdout rates vary significantly across bonds. The second takeaway is that after strong resistance to the 2005 exchange for a wide range of bonds, holdout rates tapered off dramatically in the second exchange. Post-2010 holdout rates are significant only in a handful of bonds. For example, seventy-one bonds had holdout rates greater than twenty percent in the 2005 exchange, but only seven bonds surpass that mark after the 2010 exchange. Holdout rates fall off steeply after those seven bonds, but non-trivial holdout rates are found in sixty-seven other bonds (with holdout rates of three percent or greater and an average holdout rate of 8.4%). 59 The atomization of Argentina's holdouts across so many debt instruments underscores the potential difficulty of creditor management and coordination in reaching a comprehensive final settlement.
60
To keep our analysis tractable, we focus on the seven bonds with holdout rates higher than twenty percent after the 2010 exchange. 61 The outstanding principal at the time of default of these seven bonds was $1.67 billion, which amounts to twenty-eight of the $6.03 billion of total remaining holdout bonds after the 2010 exchange. As explained below, claims on these holdout bonds have grown significantly from their initial face value. These seven bonds are also heavily litigated, making them an interesting sample for this paper.
Exhibit 2 below illustrates outstanding holdout principal by governing law. At the time of default, eighty-three percent of Argentina's debt was under New York, German, or English law. But that figure has risen to ninety-five percent now. Moreover, the only substantial increase in concentration occurs for New York law. For the 2005 exchange, such bonds amounted to forty-five percent of the total, but now they amount to fifty-nine percent.
62 So, arguably, the "run to the courthouse" could be considered the "run to the Southern District of New York" with regard to Argentina's holdout litigation. 63 In terms of currency, sixty percent of holdout debt is denominated in dollars and thirtynine percent is denominated in euros. Those ratios have been quite stable since the 2001 default. 59 The seven bonds with particularly high (above twenty percent) holdout rates plus the sixty-seven bonds with non-trivial holdout rates (above three percent) comprise the total of seventy-four bonds with meaningful holdout rates. 60 See infra Part IV.C (addressing the practical difficulties of coordinating a settlement across numerous debt instruments). 61 The seven bonds, including their currency, coupon rate, ISIN codes, maturity dates and total principal still outstanding are (the number preceding each bond is the order in which each bond appears 
II. THE VALUE OF HOLDOUT CLAIMS
This Part addresses the valuation of Argentina's holdout claims for the seven bonds in the sample, beginning with the dramatic growth of Argentina's pre-judgment interest liabilities. Interest alone-at somewhere between $2.6 and $5.3 billion depending on the judgment year-represents a significant portion of Argentina's liabilities, about 1.6 to 3.2 times the initial value of the litigated debt. Next, this Part turns to the current value of holdout claims. In doing so, this Part illustrates returns on holdout investments by comparing the purchase price of the seven-bond basket under different hypothetical investment scenarios.
A. Pre-judgment Interest Under New York Law
Although NML was litigated in federal courts, New York's statutory interest may apply when a federal court is deciding a matter of New York law. 64 Generally, pre-judgment interest applies to the award of a breach of contract from the time of the breach until a judgment is obtained. 65 Courts understand the policy behind pre-judgment interest as making a plaintiff whole by recognizing the time value of money pending litigation. 66 Courts have broad discretion in applying pre-judgment interest. 67 In federal court cases, once a judgment is meaningfully ascertained, pre-judgment interest ceases to accrue and post-judgment interest begins to accrue at the substantially lower Treasury bill rate. 68 Pre-judgment interest has two components: contract interest and interest on overdue interest. The latter is sometimes referred to as statutory interest because under New York law this rate is set by statute when a financial contract is silent on default rates of interest. 69 Contract interest, at the rate provided in the bond contract, applies to principal whereas statutory interest applies to missed interest payments. 70 Another key determination stemming from the NML litigation is related to the phrase "until the principal hereof is paid or made available for payment" in Argentina's bond documents. 71 This language renders maturity and acceleration irrelevant for the purposes of interest liabilities. As a result, Argentina's pre-judgment interest liabilities continue accumulating until the court enters into a final judgment or a settlement occurs. 72 Given the extraordinarily long duration of Argentina's debt litigation, this language makes a massive impact on interest rate liabilities. 75 In 1981, the fixed rate was adjusted to nine percent to approximate the historically high inflation environment of the time, which was 8.9% during that year. Although contracts normally specify nominal interest rates, the true return obtained by an investor is the real (or inflation-adjusted) interest rateas would be the case in a U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected security, or TIP.
Since inflation varied greatly after 1961, realized ex-post real rates of return have been much lower and more volatile than the nominal rate. The average real rate from 1962 until 2001 was 3.1%, whereas it was 6.6% from 2002 until 2015-more than twice as high. Exhibit 3 below shows the frequency distribution of the real rate of interest since 1962. The horizontal axis shows different bin ranges for the real rate, while the vertical axis reports the number of years during which the real rate fell within the range indicated by each bin. The gray bars correspond to the forty years from 1962 until 2001, while the black bars correspond to the period from 2002 to 2015, which is the default range. Simple inspection reveals that the black distribution bar sits to the right of the gray bar, which means that real rates since Argentina's default have been higher than the historical ones. , and thus focusing on two subperiods that had a constant nominal nine percent statutory rate. The p-value in this case is .017. In both cases, the interpretation is that it is extremely unlikely that the two samples that we observe (the gray bars and the black bars) come from the same original distribution, or in plain English, that they had the same mean real rate. The statistical test thus supports the view that real statutory rate since Argentina's default has been significantly higher than during previous periods. The black bar distribution is clearly shifted to the right, a fact that is confirmed by a test of statistical significance. The average real rate for the first period was 3.1% per annum whereas it was 6.7% during the second period.
As the fixed nine percent rate has grown apart from the market, it has become more controversial. 77 A real rate as high as we have observed since 2002 is more punitive than compensatory. 78 Numerous bills have been introduced and advisory recommendations made for a floating rate, but the New York legislature has yet to respond to calls for change. 79 Of the fifty states, thirty-seven have fixed pre-judgment rates and thirteen have floating 77 See Abou-Rahme & Scotch-Marmo, supra note 75, at 3. 78 See ADVISORY COMM. CIVIL PRACTICE, REPORT TO (finding the fixed nine percent rate "both illogical and unfair" and proposing a rate equivalent to a one-year Treasury bill plus three percent).
rates. 80 Of the states with fixed rates, eighteen have pre-judgment rates equal to or higher than New York's nine percent rate.
81
B. Argentina's Extraordinary Interest Liabilities
Pre-judgment interests represent a substantial part of Argentina's holdout liabilities. The high contract interest rates in Argentina's bonds, in addition to New York's nine percent prejudgment interest rate and the extremely lengthy period of the holdout disputes, led to an extraordinary accumulation of interest liabilities. Interest alone-at somewhere between $2.6 and $5.3 billionrepresents about 1.6 to 3.2 times the initial value of the litigated debt.
To help assess the importance of the New York statutory rate in the case at hand, we compute the claim value of defaulted bonds at the end of 2015 under three alternative interest rates on overdue interest: the statutory nine percent rate, a nominal rate equal to the real New York statutory rate that prevailed from 1962 until 2001 plus 2015 inflation, 83 and the one-year Treasury bill rate, which is used for post-judgment interest and, commonly, as a pre-judgment rate in federal courts deciding questions of federal law. 84 We compute interest on overdue interest as follows: (a) it begins to accumulate at the end of the calendar year in which the contract interest was originally due, and (b) it applies directly, that is with no compounding. So if a bond had an annual coupon of $12, and the holder obtained a judgment in 2008, the interest on overdue interest for the coupon from year 2002 that was 80 See Abou-Rahme & Scotch-Marmo, supra note 75. 81 Id. 82 The timing of judgments is so critical because, once the court enters into a final judgment, the claim is thereafter subject to interest at the federal post-judgment rate, which matches yields on U.S. Treasury bills. This post-judgment rate is drastically lower than contract interest plus the New York nine percent prejudgment interest. See supra Part II.A (explaining the application of pre-judgment and post-judgment rates). 83 This comes out to be 3.22% per annum. We use the realized inflation for the year ending in October missed is $12 x 6 x interest rate. 85 For the coupons missed in 2003, it would be $12 x 5 x interest rate on overdue interest, and so forth.
As noted above, when a final judgment is handed down, all amounts due are merged into a court decision and the judgment amount accrues the postjudgment interest rate until it is paid or a settlement is reached. This rate is the weekly average one-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury yield prevailing on the week before judgment is entered. 86 Given the gap between the pre-and post-judgment interest rates, the current claim value of defaulted bonds critically depends on the time when judgment was entered. We compute two scenarios thereof:
87 Scenario (ii) would correspond to "me-too" litigants who filed their claims around late 2013.
For the seven bonds at hand, since most of the held-out bonds have already been litigated, scenario (i) more closely approximates the claim values. However, we also compute scenario (ii) because it may better approximate the claim value of the other 119 bonds that still have holdouts-and many of those bonds have not been litigated yet. We compute this current claim value for each of the seven bonds and then aggregate it in the value of the overall portfolio.
Exhibit 4 below presents the results. The first row just below the column headings reports the principal outstanding of the seven-bond portfolio, which is $1.67 billion. The next row reports the overdue contract interest, which is $1.9 billion in scenario (i) and $3.21 billion in scenario (ii). The following row shows the interest on overdue interest under each of the three rates discussed above. The shaded columns report the benchmark scenario using the nine percent New York statutory rate. The next row of the table reports the judgment amount, which would be the total pre-judgment interest plus the accelerated capital. Since neither payment nor settlement has occurred, the subsequent row reports the post-judgment interest accrued until the end of 2015. The first shaded row reports the total claim value at the end of 2015. 85 For bonds that had more than one coupon per year, we neglect this subtlety and assume that all coupons were due on the last day of the year.
86 Unlike pre-judgment interest, which is calculated on a simple basis, post-judgment interest is compounded. So, if it took two years from judgment to settlement, the judgment value is grossed up by (1+T bill rate) squared. 87 88 The sheer amount of the multiplication for late litigants reinforces the importance of dealing with bondholders who have not litigated yet-an issue whose full treatment exceeds the scope of this paper. As discussed in Part III.A, given the extraordinary length of Argentina's holdout litigation, the historically high statutory pre-judgment rate is critically important. 89 Argentina is now paying the price-a costly instance of boilerplate contracting.
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C. Hypothetical Bondholder Returns
Though perhaps lacking direct legal consequence for a breach of contract dispute between sophisticated parties, the overall fairness or legitimacy will figure prominently in potential settlement negotiations between Argentina and the holdouts. Likewise, specific components of investor returns such as prejudgment interest will likely be the subject of scrutiny. Additionally, the outcome of the NML negotiations carries broader implications for sovereign finance. 91 Against this backdrop, we analyze the returns that holdout litigants could have obtained by purchasing bonds at different points in time, now standing to recover the claim value documented in Exhibit 4. 88 We then present the results of this exercise for a portfolio of the seven bonds in the sample weighted by outstanding principal of each bond at the end of 2001. Specifically, these calculations illustrate returns from purchasing bonds in a given year, holding out from the 2005 and 2010 exchanges, and litigating.
Exhibit 5: Returns from Purchasing Defaulted Bonds and Holding Out
This table reports the returns for holdouts who purchased our seven-bond basket in the secondary market after Argentina's default and collected the claim value at the end of 2015. We compute such returns under three hypothetical rates of interest on overdue interest, and for two judgment dates. Purchase prices and claim values are expressed per $100 of principal outstanding of each bond. We report two measures of return: compound annual average returns, and cumulative wealth from investing one dollar. In the benchmark case (shaded columns), investors in defaulted bonds multiplied their wealth an average of between eight and thirteen times depending on when judgment was handed down. See Part II.C for details.
The first column in Exhibit 5 shows the year during which the bond portfolio was purchased, ranging from 2002 until 2013. The second column reports the purchase price of the basket of bonds. 92 One difference between these figures and those in Exhibit 4 is that here we report bond prices and claim values per one hundred dollars of outstanding principal, whereas Exhibit 4 uses the aggregate outstanding amount of the seven bonds and their claim value. So, as noted in the first two columns of the table, the bond basket cost 92 For details on the sources of the price construction, see Appendix. 
III. THE CURRENT VALUE OF THE 2005 RESTRUCTURING OFFER
As previously noted, Argentina's present value haircut was high compared to the international historical record. 94 However, that present value haircut reflects the market's valuation of the exchange bond and GDP-linked warrant basket as of June 2005. That measure is useful to understand the high holdout rates for the 2005 exchange and the wave of litigation that occurred thereafter. However, the exchange bonds have performed very well thus far. Argentina's GDP-linked warrants, in particular, have provided their holders with 93 Since purchase prices are annual averages, we measure the time elapsed from purchase to final claim value, starting from the middle of the purchase year until December 2015. Hence, the basket of bonds bought in mid-2012 was held during 3.5 years: $1 x (1+1. 158) 3.5 = $14.76. 94 
A. Returns on Participation
Compared to the historical record of sovereign debt restructurings, the creditor haircut in Argentina's 2005 exchange was high. 95 The harsh present value haircut explains why holdout rates in the 2005 exchange were so high and why litigation mushroomed. 96 In Argentina's 2005 and 2010 exchanges, a GDP-linked warrant was offered as a "sweetener" to entice creditor participation. 97 These securities, which are detachable and tradable independently from the exchange bonds, provide payments linked to GDP growth.
98 These GDP-linked warrants have performed phenomenally since the 2005 exchange.
99
Comparing the ex-post realized returns of different investments with Argentina's 2005 exchange bonds and GDP-linked warrants provides some perspective. Exhibit 6 below illustrates returns on an investment of one U.S. dollar in various securities when Argentina's first exchange settled on June 2, 2015. Our calculations assume that all dividends and coupon payments were reinvested in the original security that paid them. It is important to assess the return on Argentine exchange bonds against the broader canvass of other wellknown assets. The table shows that the accumulated wealth from investing one dollar in 2005 in U.S. Treasuries, the S&P 500, Argentina's stock market 95 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 96 we use the prices of their Argentine-law U.S. dollar-denominated counterparts. Only the jurisdiction differed among these bonds, not the promised payments. Argentina has been making payments on the local law bonds despite the injunctions that came into effect in 2014.
invested, Argentina's GDP-linked warrants have provided astronomical returns. 102 Therefore, for participating bondholders who held on to their exchange bonds, the overall ex-post performance has been much less painful than initially expected. For example, the GDP-linked warrants provided windfall gains but were given virtually no value in the 2005 exchange. 103 As a result, the exchange has actually been very costly for the Argentine government.
104 A harsh present value haircut hindered creditor participation and spawned high rates of litigation. 105 Unfortunately, after imposing a drastic haircut, Argentina actually ended up paying out a great deal on the exchange instruments. In a way, Argentina neither has its cake, nor ate it.
As will be discussed in Part IV, settling the holdout claims will involve a haircut on the legal claims.
106 When thinking about a haircut, the current value of the 2005 exchange offer is compelling and interesting for two reasons. First, it reflects an interest in respecting a principle of inter-creditor equity vis-á-vis exchange bondholders who accepted the 2005 offer. Second, it allows a simple benchmarking of whatever settlement offer is ultimately made compared to the 2005 restructuring, which had a high degree of support in Argentine society.
B. The Holdout Trust
The subsequent analysis assumes that Argentina's government issued exchange bonds and GDP-linked warrants in 2005 for our seven-bond portfolio on the same terms as the average bondholder participating in the exchange. Furthermore, we assume that these exchange bonds were put in a trust account 102 For an early assessment of the high realized ex-post returns on the exchange bonds and GDP-linked held on behalf of bondholders and kept for them until the end of 2015. 107 We assume that each time that the Argentine government made payments to the exchange bondholders, the holdout trust received ratable payments as well.
In order to carry out the 2005 restructuring, Argentina defined an "eligible" amount for each defaulted bond. This amount equaled the principal outstanding at the time of default plus the accrued and unpaid interest up to and including December 31, 2001.
108 Our seven-bond portfolio, which had an outstanding principal of $1.67 billion as mentioned above, would have had an exchangeeligible amount of $1.71 billion.
Exhibit 7 below shows the face value amounts of bonds and warrants in each currency that would have been given to the trustee. These values are computed in proportion to the total amount of new bonds issued in the 2005 exchange relative to the total eligible value of old bonds tendered in it. In other words, the trust would receive the same basket of bonds that the average participating bondholder obtained in the 2005 exchange for each dollar of eligible old debt. As the table shows, the trust would have GDP-linked warrants for $1.71 billion (823 million denominated in pesos, 473 million denominated in dollars, and 416 million denominated in euros). 109 Moreover, the trust would have received a total $968 million face value of new bonds: 431 million dollars of bonds denominated in pesos, 278 million in dollars, and 259 million dollars of bonds denominated in euros. The table also shows the breakdown of discount, par, and quasi-par by currency of denomination of the new bonds. 108 Including these unpaid interests was done at the request of-among others-Argentina's Bond
Restructuring Agency, a bondholder group. 109 All figures in our calculations are in U.S. dollars using the official exchange rates noted in Argentina's Prospectus Supplement. See Prospectus Supplement, supra note 20. 110 For tractability, and given the extremely low liquidity of Japanese yen exchange bonds, we assumed that the 0.7% corresponding to new bonds issued in that currency in 2005 were actually denominated in euros.
Exhibit 7: Face Value of the New Bonds Issued for the Benefit of the Seven Held-Out Bond Portfolio
This table reports the face value amount of each new security that the holders of our sevenbond portfolio would have obtained in the 2005 exchange if they were to get the same basket of new securities than the other tendering bondholders. All values are in millions of U.S. dollars, using the official exchange rates for the 2005 exchange.
C. Reinvestment of Intermediate Cash Flows
One critical question that the trustee would have had to address is how to deal with the cash paid by the Republic to the trust over the years. There are two sources of cash that the trust would have received. First is the initial cash that was given at the time of the exchange to pay bondholders for the interest on the new bonds that accrued from December 31, 2003, which was the issue date of the new bonds, until June 2, 2005, which was the exchange settlement date.
111 Second, and more important, are the coupons that were paid over time on the new bonds and on the GDP-linked warrants.
We make two assumptions as to the allocation of these interim cash flows. In the first scenario, we assume that they were used to purchase fractional units of the same mother security that paid those cash flows. To this end, we used the closing price of the new securities on the ex-coupon date, at each point in time from 2005 until 2015. Thus, every time that Argentina paid a service on the new securities, we are assuming that the trustee went to the market and bought more units of the same security at the market price prevailing at that time. 112 In the second scenario, we assume that the trustee invested all interim cash flows at the six-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and rolled over the accumulated cash position every semester. 114 The difference in values shows the very steep growth of Argentina's liabilities due to pre-judgment interests discussed above. The dotted gray line reports the same value but assumes that judgment was handed down in 2015, which is a typical situation for the "me-too" plaintiffs. The solid black line reports the value of the 2005 offer assuming that interim cash flows were reinvested in the same mother security that paid those cash flows. The dashed black line reflects the same value but assumes that interim cash flows were invested at the six-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and rolled over until the end of the sample. At the end of the sample, the value of the 2005 offer with reinvestment in the same mother security strategy amounts to fifty-two percent of the claim value for holdouts that obtained judgments in 2008.
As noted above, the majority of the holdouts of the seven bonds in our sample have litigated and obtained money judgments for their claims. Hence, the gray dashed line better represents the value of their claims for the specific case of these seven bonds. However, we provide the dotted gray line because it reflects the value of the "me-toos" who have litigated only recently or have not litigated at all-a situation that may be more representative of the other 119 bonds that still have holdouts. The material difference between these two lines again underscores the difficulty of settling with a broad array of holdouts with significant variation in their claims.
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The two bottom curves show the value of the trust just described at the end of each quarter since the 2005 exchange. The solid black line reports the investment-in-same security strategy while the dashed black line depicts the investment-in-U.S. Treasury bills strategy. Since values are expressed per one hundred dollars of original outstanding principal of old bonds, the trust for the holders of the seven-bond portfolio would have obtained a basket of new bonds that had a market value of thirty-seven dollars at the time of the exchange. 116 It may come as a surprise that the value of the trust sometimes rises but other times falls. This is because such value uses the market price of the trust's securities at the end of each quarter. Thus, in times like the 2008 crisis, when the prices of risky assets fell worldwide, so too did the value of the trust, regardless of how interim cash flows were allocated.
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In spite of these cyclicalities, the value of the trust displays a secular rise in value. By the end of 2015, the holdings of the trust fund are worth $133 under the reinvest-in-same security strategy (reinvestment strategy) and ninety-nine dollars under the invest-in-Treasury bill strategy (T-bill strategy). 118 The thirtyfive percent gap among the results of the two strategies is notable, in part because Argentina paid the same amount of money under both options at each point in time. The difference poses an intriguing question, which, because of its sheer magnitude, is an important one: as of December 2015, how much did the 2005 exchange really cost Argentina? We now address this question.
The first option has a higher value because the interim cash flows were reinvested on very favorable terms. This is because the price of Argentine bonds and warrants over time has been low relative to its current value and also relative to the services that they have paid. It was therefore much more 115 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 116 A cursory reading of these figures would suggest that the haircut was sixty-three percent, which differs from the 73.4% figure mentioned for Argentina's 2005 exchange. See Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 28. Note that the former figure uses the face value of the old debt, while the latter one uses the present value of the old debt. See id. at 88-89 (explaining the difference between these two haircut concepts). 117 To sum the value of the holdings in different currencies, we convert the value of the securities denominated in pesos and euros to dollars using the free market exchange rates prevailing at the end of each quarter. 118 The end of sample prices correspond to November 24, 2015.
profitable to reinvest interim cash flows in the same security that paid them than to park those cash flows at the Treasury bill rate. In a way, the reinvestment strategy reflects the joint effect of what Argentina has been paying combined with unduly pessimistic ex-ante expectations that the market has had about Argentina since the 2005 offer compared to the ex-post reality. Nevertheless, the solid black line does reflect the current value of the 2005 offer in the following way: if, at the time that each cash-flow service came due after issuance and until the end of the sample, Argentina did not pay it in cash (to the trust fund caring for the holdouts) but rather paid it by issuing new quantities of the instrument whose coupon came due, then the solid black line exactly reflects the value that holder would now have, and the value that the 2005 offer really cost Argentina expressed in money at the end of 2015. We conclude that the reinvestment strategy better approximates the cost of the 2005 offer to Argentina expressed at the end of the sample.
E. Haircut of a Hypothetical Offer
Here we explore the implications of a hypothetical settlement offer resembling the value of the 2005 exchange. We then compare that hypothetical offer with the current value of holdout claims for our seven-bond portfolio. In doing so, we show below that the final haircut in this hypothetical settlement could be as low as forty-eight percent, even relative to the full benchmark claim value.
The bottom of Exhibit 4 shows these values but, instead of expressing them per one hundred dollars of initial outstanding principal, it expresses them for the full outstanding principal of the basket, which is $1.67 as noted before. As shown therein, the current value of the 2005 offer, expressed in these latter units, is $2.23 billion in the reinvestment strategy and $1.65 billion in the Tbill strategy. Compared to the current value of the claim for litigants who obtained judgments in 2008, they would amount to forty-eight percent and sixty-one percent haircuts under New York's nine percent statutory rate. If we used a more lenient interest on overdue interest, like the Treasury bill rate that is used in federal courts, the haircut would be forty-two percent and fifty-seven percent, respectively. These haircut figures fall within the range of the historical record. In fact, the average haircut in the twenty sovereign debt restructurings involving non-HIPC countries after the Brady plan (and excluding Argentina in 2005) is exactly forty-two percent. 119 In a nutshell, the haircut that would stem from an exchange offer in which Argentina gave holdouts the current value of the 2005 offer would be within the ballpark of sovereign debt restructuring experiences since the end of the Brady Plan. The vast majority of these restructurings did not lead to significant holdout litigation.
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In analyzing these haircut calculations, it is important to bear in mind that they underestimate the true haircut that claimants will take upon the settlement of the suit if they hold on to new Argentine bonds. This is due to the fact that, by reducing uncertainty, a settlement will create value. Specifically, a settlement will mean that-all else equal-the yield on Argentine government securities will fall, propping up their market price, and hence reducing the haircut. This will happen both to the basket of 2005 exchange securities, if Argentina offered holdouts the "actual" 2005 exchange bonds and GDP-linked warrants that would be in the hypothetical trust fund, or to any new bonds that Argentina might issue to pay a settlement. In this sense, it is worth noting that by agreeing to a given haircut, the holdouts will automatically reduce their own pain, which strengthens settlement incentives among holdouts.
IV. TOWARDS A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT
Settling a large number of holdout claims at the post-trial stage, the situation facing Argentina in some ways resembles a typical sovereign restructuring. Argentina's holdout settlement will likely involve a creditor haircut and another debt issuance. Less certain is how Argentina will achieve-in strategic and practical terms-the goal of settling claims with a fractured and diverse group of creditors. 121 Indeed, concerns surrounding intercreditor equity and holdout participation flared up almost immediately after Argentina's initial settlement offer. 122 Many of Argentina's holdout creditorsthe "me toos"-have not even filed claims yet. This Part will first address challenges facing courts tasked with adjudicating sovereign debt disputes and policy factors at play in Argentina's holdout situation. negotiations, ultimately concluding that the injunctions should be modified or lifted to facilitate the settlement process.
A. Adjudicating Sovereign Debt Disputes
Adjudicating sovereign debt disputes is a complicated task. The legal system-or lack thereof, rather-for sovereign debt is patchy and awkward. 123 For one, sovereign debt obligations are simultaneously "unenforceable-yetnondischargeable," which creates complex pressures for courts and disputing parties alike. 124 Furthermore, sovereign debt markets exist in a legal void, lacking a direct regulatory or institutional authority. 125 As a result, in sovereign debt litigation, courts of general jurisdiction are called upon to adjudicate contractual disputes involving complicated insolvency situations better suited for a bankruptcy system. 126 Without the bankruptcy toolkit, courts are left with blunt mechanisms for intricate situations. 127 Together, these legal vacuums in the status quo sovereign debt system make for unpredictable and dysfunctional results. 128 Exacerbating these problems, creditor fragmentation in sovereign debt markets has complicated coordination and collective action problems. 129 These problems have been most visible in the restructuring phase of sovereign debt, but NML demonstrates that creditor coordination problems can exist even in the settlement phase.
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Without a formal bankruptcy system, sovereigns have relied on the limited enforceability of debt contracts to encourage participation in restructurings. 131 Enforcing judgments against an unwilling sovereign remains a highly uncertain and expensive venture. 132 These risks incentivize creditor participation in restructurings, even when sovereigns lack the threat of bankruptcy. Even though participation is voluntary, holdout rates in sovereign debt restructurings are generally quite low. 133 Although retail investors or pensioners are sometimes among the holdouts, the business of holding out on a sovereign restructuring to litigate for a profit is largely limited to highly specialized distressed debt hedge funds. 134 The business model requires a hearty appetite for risk and an ample war chest to fund-potentially-several years of litigation and asset hunting. 135 Sovereign debt contracts have evolved in response to legal voids, collective action, and coordination problems-albeit in an incomplete, piecemeal fashion. 136 While contractual responses to problems in sovereign debt are relatively easy to implement, they are often limited in scope. 137 Collective action clauses (CACs) are designed to alleviate coordination problems among creditors by enabling a qualified majority of creditors (usually seventy-five percent) to change critical bond payment terms. 138 as a cure for holdout problems in sovereign debt. 139 But that view is probably too optimistic. Many outstanding sovereign bonds simply do not have CACs. 140 When they do, CACs are often limited in scope. 141 Recent improvements, responding in part to the NML decisions, are especially promising. 142 But contractual solutions to problems in sovereign debt remain incomplete, despite the persistence of longstanding problems. 143 The NML court responded to Argentina's unwillingness to pay with injunctive relief broadly applicable to third parties. 144 Enforcement through ratable payment injunctions solves certain problems posed by a recalcitrant sovereign defendant. 145 In doing so, however, this approach creates a number of new problems. 146 First, ratable payment injunctions endanger restructuring incentives for sovereign creditors by aggravating the classical prisoner's dilemma problem that affects them. 147 Second, enforcing sovereign debt through injunctive remedies shifts costs and burdens to innocent third parties. 148 Exchange bondholders from the 2005 and 2010 swaps have gone unpaid since the NML injunctions came into effect. 149 A wave of secondary litigation also followed, dragging financial intermediaries into the fray. 150 Finally-and most pressing for the current situation-ratable payment injunctions could also paralyze a sovereign defendant's incentives to settle with holdouts. 151 This is especially true when a uniform settlement offer, like Argentina's, creates inter-creditor inequity in terms of disparity in returns. 152 Absent inter-creditor coordination to distribute returns in an equitable manner, Argentina's offer would result in dramatically different returns (or haircuts) on the various creditor claims. 153 Exhibit 8, for example, illustrates the dramatic differences in the value of various holdout claims just based on when a judgment is obtained. Reactions to Argentina's initial settlement proposal showed the potential for holdout problems to undermine settlement negotiations as well. 154 
B. Settling Sovereign Debt Disputes
The historical record indicates that, in the vast majority of sovereign debt disputes, the litigating parties arrive at a negotiated settlement. 155 Moreover, the presiding judge has repeatedly encouraged the parties to reach a negotiated settlement, but to no avail. 156 A settlement between Argentina and the NML holdouts would likely resemble a typical sovereign debt restructuring in fundamental ways. For one, sovereign insolvency situations are often resolved through a voluntary exchange of existing (distressed or defaulted) debt obligations for new debt obligations. 157 A settlement with the NML holdouts would likely involve the issuance of new bonds by Argentina. 158 Also, Argentina's settlement with NML holdouts would likely include a haircut on the full value of the claim.
159 Structuring a settlement with numerous creditors is challenging enough. But settling a large number of claims with vastly different valuations and highly divergent creditors-from individual pensioners to distressed debt hedge funds-promises to be even more challenging. Below we explain how the NML injunctions make an exceedingly challenging task a deeply irrational one.
C. Ratable Payment Injunctions Versus Negotiated Settlement
For years, the district court has correctly recognized that the only realistic way out of the NML litigation is through settlement. In doing so, the court has recognized that a settlement for less than the full claim amount is the most likely outcome. 160 More recently, the court has continued to reiterate the view that a negotiated settlement is the only answer. 161 However, the court faces a dilemma between enforcing holdout claims and encouraging settlement. As currently drafted, the district court's very own ratable payment injunctions present a serious impediment to settlement. This dilemma exposes an additional problem associated with using injunctions to enforce sovereign debt judgments: settlement complications.
The NML injunctions prohibit Argentina from paying exchange creditors from previous restructurings until holdout claims have been paid in their entirety. Since the outstanding holdout creditors are not bound by collective action mechanisms, certain holdouts within the holdouts may remain even after a settlement exchange offer. 163 As a result, under the current injunctions, even just one settlement holdout could hijack payments to existing exchange creditors and future settlement creditors. Put differently, NML-style injunctions mean that anything less than one hundred percent participation could derail the entire settlement effort. These issues raise doubts about the viability and participation incentives for a potential settlement of NML. Making matters worse, on a practical level, locating and coordinating all the holders in Argentina's 126 outstanding bonds with holdouts is a difficult task. 164 Unlike more straightforward commercial cases between sophisticated parties, the enforcement of sovereign debt litigation can involve weighty social and policy questions, including serious collateral costs for third parties. 165 As an equitable remedy, public interests and collateral costs for third parties are especially relevant in considering the use of injunctive relief. 166 With a new administration at the helm, Argentina demonstrated good faith in quickly putting forth a reasonable settlement offer. 167 If Argentina's publicly stated defiance of court orders was a primary driving force behind the injunctions, perhaps Argentina's good faith efforts towards a negotiated settlement would be cause to reconsider the NML injunctions. 168 As a matter of policy, a sovereign's legitimate interest in restructuring unsustainable debt is just the beginning. Collateral costs for innocent third parties loom large as well. 169 
CONCLUSIONS
In earlier phases of the NML litigation, the Southern District of New York recognized Argentina's economic realities and interest in restructuring a substantial debt burden. 170 But adjudicating sovereign debt disputes is no easy task. Institutional voids and limited enforceability only make matters more difficult for courts. 171 As a result, striking a balance between the legitimate restructuring needs of a sovereign debtor, the interests of innocent third parties, and the legitimate rights of creditors is a complicated goal. Though injunctive remedies may serve to force an unwilling sovereign debtor to the negotiating table, collateral costs can be significant. NML also demonstrates that enforcing sovereign debt through injunctions can potentially obstruct a settlement process by exacerbating creditor coordination problems. Additionally, our analysis offers a framework for what can be considered a baseline for comparisons in holdout negotiations and Argentina's settlement offer. 170 that has the observed prices in 2007 and 2012, but which for each year in the interim has a variation that is proportional to that in the portfolio of like bonds. #48: Average of DAB, STGT, GERM and FRNK.
